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Abstract
We estimate how banks respond to regulatory capital requirements. We use a novel mea-
sure called capital surplus/shortfall, which we construct from notifications on regulatory capital
requirements sent to Slovenian banks over the period 2009-2015. Capital surplus/shortfall is
more relevant than capital adequacy ratio (CAR). It conveys more information about future
lending because it is a forward-looking measure of bank capitalization. Our paper carries policy
implications for supervisors in countries with a distressed banking sector. Using this measure we
show that the same firm has on average a 3.54 p.p. lower loan growth when the loan is obtained
through a bank with 1 p.p. higher capital shortfall. Finally, we show that in response to an
increase in capital requirements banks engage in risk-taking behaviour.
JEL Classification Codes: G01, G21, G28
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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis induced policymakers to introduce instruments that aim at preventing and
mitigating the effects of systemic risks. These instruments are collectively called macro-prudential
instruments. Of the macro-prudential instruments several are related to capital requirements1.
However, it is not entirely clear how policy-related changes in capital requirements, whether they
are micro- or macro-prudential, affect bank behaviour. We investigate how they affect banks by
using a new and timely measure of policy-related changes in capital.
We show that the conventional variables used to estimate the effect of policy-related changes in
capital on credit supply are flawed. The reason is twofold. First, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR)
measures the ratio of a bank’s capital to its risk-weighted assets. It contains policy and non-policy-
induced changes in capital. The coefficient on the CAR will thus also reflect non-policy related
changes2. By using it as a proxy for policy-related changes the estimated response of banks will be
biased. Second, capital requirements are announced to the banks before they become binding. They
can adapt to them before the final change in capital is recorded.
In this paper, we account for these two facts and provide a new estimate of how banks respond
to policy-related changes in capital. With the help of the supervision department of the Bank of
Slovenia, we collected notification letters. They inform banks on their future required CAR that is
to be fulfilled in a year. We calculate the difference between a bank’s current CAR and its future
required ratio and call it Surplus/Shortfall. We use it to estimate the effects of policy-related
changes in capital requirements on credit supply.
We consider the Slovenian banking system, which was among the most severely affected in the
global financial crisis. Due to high credit risk, its share of non-performing loans (NPLs) reached 25%
for the corporate sector in 2013. This triggered bank re-capitalizations that amounted to more than
20% of GDP (in 2014). It places Slovenia third according to recapitalization costs among European
countries (see Hartmann et al. (2018)) and makes it particularly suitable for analysis of distressed
banking systems.
The literature on the effects of policy-induced changes in capital on credit supply is scarce.
Seminal papers investigate how (reduced) shocks to capital affect bank behaviour: Bernanke et al.
1E.g. counter-cyclical capital buffer, systemic risk buffer, capital conservation buffer and other. See Claessens
(2015).
2For example, an increase in CAR due to recapitalization is likely to increase credit supply (see for example Beccalli
et al. (2018) who show that bank recapitalizations lead to asset expansion). But an increase in capital, that is due to
stricter policy requirements, is likely to decrease credit supply.
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(1991), Hancock and Wilcox (1994) and Hancock et al. (1995)3. Bernanke et al. (1991) use bank
capital to explain credit supply. Capital alone cannot be used as a proxy for policy-related changes
in capital requirements because it is not a policy-induced target like Surplus/Shortfall. Hancock
and Wilcox (1994) and Hancock et al. (1995) use the deviation of capital to assets ratio from an
estimated target capital. Yet, target capital does not necessarily reflect policy decisions. Other
approaches include Kishan and Opiela (2000) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004). They use a
variant of capital that could be a lagged or contaminated signal for the true notifications on capital
requirements.
Some of the cited literature does not claim that they are investigating the effects of policy-
induced changes in capital on credit supply, but they often draw policy conclusions. Other papers
use the capital requirement ratio to draw them. See for example, Thakor (1996), Gambacorta and
Mistrulli (2004), and Aiyar et al. (2016). These papers are closer to our approach. However, they do
not take into account that requirements are disclosed to banks before they become legally binding.
Bank’s current CAR thus reflects past policy announcements. This timing mismatch could bias
the coefficients and render policy implications incorrect. Surplus/Shortfall does not suffer from a
timing mismatch because it is a forward-looking measure of bank capitalization.
Based on a sample of Slovenian banks, for the period 2009-2015, we find that the same firm has
on average a 3.5 p.p. lower loan growth in banks with 1 p.p. higher capital shortfall. We show
that if the CAR is used as a proxy for policy-related changes, the estimated effect is only 0.8 p.p.
When we use both measures in a single model, the coefficient on the CAR decreases and becomes
insignificant. This implies that our measure of capital shortfall is a superior proxy for policy-related
changes in capital. It delivers quantitatively and qualitatively different results when compared to
the CAR. For this reason, policymakers and academics should strive to record or recover a series of
notification dates. This will enable them to better assess their effect on bank behaviour.
We also show that banks with a capital shortfall tend to engage in risky behaviour. Compared
to banks with a surplus they lend less to firms with the highest credit rating and provision less for
NPLs.4 By implication, policymakers should not only be concerned with a capital shortfall. They
should closely supervise the risk-taking by banks after the capital requirement is announced.
We conclude the empirical part with a finding that firms cannot compensate for the decrease
in lending by borrowing more from banks with a surplus. Increased capital requirements have a
3See also Berrospide and Edge (2010).
4These results are consistent with Brezigar-Masten et al. (2015). They show that in the crisis period Slovenian
3
negative effect on aggregate firm borrowing. This was expected since it is difficult for firms to switch
to a different bank during a crisis period.
Note that the literature cited above suffers from an omitted variable bias. The variable that is
omitted is loan demand5. The above-cited authors attempt to control for it by including macroe-
conomic variables. The problem, however, is that one can never be sure if this control is sufficient.
Our results are free from this problem. We use the Khwaja and Mian (2008) difference-in-difference
model on detailed data form credit registry. Our model controls for all effects that vary across firms
and in time, including also the demand for loans. It is further explained in the Model section.
An important recent contribution, that conforms with our results, is provided by Gropp et al.
(2019). They use the EBA 2011 capital exercise to investigate how banks responded to a one-time
increase in capital requirements. Similar to us, they find that banks ration on credit to improve
on their capital ratios. They show that increased capital requirements resulted in a reduction in
firm investment, sales and growth. This is an important transmission channel of financial shocks
to the real economy. We instead focus on risk and loan loss provisioning. This enables us to draw
policy conclusions related to credit risk, the most important determinant of a sound financial sector.
Gropp et al. (2019) data is, in a geographical sense, representative for the euro area whereas we use a
single country data that focuses on a distressed banking system. They focus on a single time period
whereas we study the response of banks over a period of seven years. Our sample, although more
restricted in the geographic scope, includes all loans and not only syndicated loans. Syndicated loans
are loans given by a syndicate of banks predominantly to large international corporations. Finally,
we control for individual firm loan demand whereas Gropp et al. (2019) control for firm-cluster level
demand. The two papers are complementary in their results.
Another recent working paper is provided by De Jonghe et al. (2016). They study how regulatory
capital requirements affect Belgian banks’ balance sheet composition and supply of loans to firms.
They find that capital requirements have a small effect on bank lending. They do not take into
account that only banks with a capital shortfall are required to adjust their capital adequacy. We
find that the effect of capital surplus on lending is insignificant but the effect of capital shortfall is
substantial and significant. We use growth of loans before and after a required CAR is announced.
They use quarterly loan growth rate as a dependent variable. This could attenuate their coefficients
since banks tend to adjust their assets around the time of the announcement.
banks underestimated credit risk, more so if they were weakly capitalized.
5Ciccarelli et al. (2015) control for it by including indicators of demand obtained from a bank lending survey. For
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Three other papers that are close to ours are Jiménez et al. (2017), Mesonnier and Monks (2015)
and Behn et al. (2016). Jiménez et al. (2017) use the same estimation strategy, the difference-in-
difference model. They investigate how dynamic provisioning affects loan supply before the crisis.
Dynamic provisioning can be interpreted as a form of capital requirement. We instead investigate
the period after the financial crisis and use data on future capital requirements. Mesonnier and
Monks (2015) study the impact of EBA’s 2011/2012 capital exercise on lending. Like us, they use
announced increases in capital requirements, that were largely unexpected. Their analysis is done
at a bank level and can control for demand only at a country level. We control for it at a firm level.
Behn et al. (2016) study the effect of model-based capital regulation on bank lending. Following
an exogenous increase in credit risk in Germany, caused by the collapse of the Lehman Brothers
in 2008, model-based capital requirements increased by 0.5 p.p. They that in response banks that
used IRB regulatory approach contracted loan amount by 2.1 to 3.9 p.p. more than banks that
used the standardized approach. They study the impact of increased capital requirements that are
endogenous to the IRB regulatory approach. Our findings are based on policy-related increases in
capital requirements.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: presenting our data on capital requirements,
applying the model, demonstrating results and finishing with conclusions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents data on capital requirements
and notification letters. The model is described in Section 3. Section 4 contains the main empirical
analysis and Section 5 concludes.
2 Capital Requirements
The Slovenian banking system is subject to the Basel II regulatory framework since 2007 and to the
Basel III framework since 2013. Under Pillar II of the Basel II and III banks are required to fulfill
minimum capital requirements, which are subject to supervisory review.
The supervisory review consists of two steps. The first step, called the Internal Capital Adequacy
Assessment Process (ICAAP), requires banks to internally asses their capital adequacy. The second
step, called the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP), requires the supervisor to
review the bank’s self-assessment. The key output of the ICAAP-SREP process is summarized in
the required CAR. Bank’s CAR is the ratio between a bank’s capital and its risk-weighted assets
a critique of this approach see Peydro (2010) .
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(hereafter RWA). Bank’s required CAR is the amount of capital, also expressed as a share of risk-
weighted assets, that a bank is required to hold to be considered as adequately capitalized.
The SREP was conducted for the first time by the Bank of Slovenia in 2009. Each April the banks
report their internal assessment of adequate capitalization (ICAAP). The Bank of Slovenia revises
it and issues its own recommendation (SREP)6, usually by August each year. Some banks are found
to be undercapitalized and some overcapitalized. If the bank is undercapitalized, the supervision
department of the Bank of Slovenia holds a meeting with it where they discuss necessary adjustments.
The bank is given six months to submit a written action plan7. Except in 2013, banks have always
restored the adequate capital ratio within a year.
A bank has a capital shortfall if its CAR is lower than the required one and is obligated to
increase its capital share in RWA. If a bank has a capital surplus it is not required to adjust. In
Table 1 we present summary statistics across surplus and shortfall banks. On average, there are
13 surplus banks per year with an average surplus of 2.8% of the RWA. There are fewer shortfall
banks, 4.4 per year on average, and they hold an average shortfall of 3.3%. Besides total capital
requirements, we also present information on Tier 1 capital requirements8. Average surplus/shortfall
in Tier 1 capital requirements is similar to total capital requirements.
In the last four rows of Table 1 we characterize the surplus and shortfall banks according to their
CAR, share of NPLs, asset size and the number of firms which they were lending to at the time of
capital announcements. Banks with a shortfall are characterized by lower capital adequacy and a
higher share of NPLs. Their total assets are of similar size compared to banks with a surplus. Banks
with shortfall hold a lower average number of lending relations because there are fewer of them.
The bank needs to address its shortfall within a year. It can restore its capital adequacy by
increasing capital (the numerator) or by decreasing the risk-weighted assets (the denominator).9
A bank can increase its capital either by raising new capital or by retaining profit. A bank can
decrease its risk-weighted assets by decreasing risky assets (such as risky loans) or by restructuring
its current assets10. In expansions, when profit is abundant, the banks often re-capitalize from
6The regulation on adequate bank capitalization includes capital provisions for different types of risk. The most
important types of risk are credit risk, liquidity and operational risk. Further information can be found on the
European Banking Association’s web page.
7The banks are required to hand in a written action plan since 2013. It defines the steps that the bank will take
to restore adequate capitalization.
8Tier 1 capital requirements are defined more narrowly compared to total capital requirements.
9The bank needs to increase its capital by more than its risk-weighted assets or decrease its risk-weighted assets
by more than its capital.
10The bank can re-qualify existing loans into a higher quality brackets by obtaining proof that they are safe or by
obtaining new guarantees related to the loan. Banks can also sell off a risky subordinated firm to increase its CAR.
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Table 1: Average values across surplus and shortfall banks
Banks with Surplus Banks with Shortfall Total
Number of banks per year 13 4.4 17.4
Total Surplus/shortfall (% of RWA) 2.8 -3.3 1.2
Tier 1 Surplus/shortfall (% of RWA) 3.4 -3.4 1.7
Capital adequacy (% of RWA) 14.0 10.4 12.9
Share of NPLs (%) 8.9 15.5 10.5
Total assets (EUR bln) 2.6 2.5 2.6
Number of firm-bank relations per year 38614 11726 50340
Source: Bank of Slovenia, own calculations.
Notes: The table reports the average values in periods when SREP letter was sent to the banks. Total
(Tier 1) Surplus/Shortfall is surplus/shortfall in total (Tier 1) capital requirements. Share of NPLs is
defined as share of loans classified in C, D or E rating class.
retained earnings. In contractions, it is harder for them to do so. In contractions, it is more likely
that banks will utilize a decrease in loans in order to restore their capital adequacy.
Our policy variable (bank surplus/shortfall) is expressed in terms of the two CARs:
Surplus/Shortfallit = CARit −RCARit (1)
where CARit represents bank i’s CAR in period t and RCARit represents the required CAR.
t relates to the period when a bank received the letter of notification11 on its adequate CAR and
up to the period when a new letter on a new required CAR (RCARit+1) is received. The capital
surplus/shortfall is forward-looking because banks have up to a year to adjust their CAR (CARit)
towards the required ratio (RCARit). E.g.: a bank with a 2 p.p. shortfall needs to increase its
CAR by 2 p.p. in a year’s time following the notification. A bank with a surplus is not required to
adjust its capital. However, higher capital, holding everything else constant, will render a bank less
profitable per capital unit. Therefore, the bank has an incentive to increase its risk-weighted assets
(e.g., by increasing loans).
Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect that the effect of the capital shortfall and surplus is
asymmetric for lending. Given that only banks with a shortfall are required to adjust their capital,
we expect them to react stronger than banks with a surplus. To account for asymmetric effects we
introduce an interaction variable Surplus/Shortfall ×DShortfall:
Surplus/Shortfallit ×DShortfallit =
[
CARit −RCARit
]
× I(CARit < RCARit) (2)
11Note that in some cases two notification letters were sent to an individual bank within a single SREP process.
In such cases we disregard the second letter and only take into account the first letter. After the first letter has been
received, the bank is already informed on policy maker’s view of its adequacy and the second letter can no longer be
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where I(.) is an indicator function that takes value 1 when the condition in the brackets is met and
0 otherwise. This is the same variable as Surplus/Shortfall except that it has zeros when a bank
has capital surplus.
We expect a positive coefficient on the interaction variable. The higher the Shortfallit (the more
negative the variable is), the larger is the expected decrease in loan growth, since it restores capital
adequacy. We later show that Surplus/Shortfall is a superior measure in terms of explaining credit
growth when compared to the CAR (CARit).
In Figure 1 we present a zoomed-in scatter plot between loan growth at the firm-level (y-axis)
and Surplus/Shortfall (x-axis). The scatter plot is zoomed in because firm-level loan changes
are very dispersed. This obstructs visual representation of results. 12 Gray points are individual
loans, and the black line is the fit between them and capital Surplus/Shortfall. An increase in
Surplus/Shortfall is associated with an increase in loan growth.
Figure 1: Micro loan growth (y axis) and Surplus/Shortfall (x axis)
Source: Bank of Slovenia, own calculations.
In this Figure we present a zoomed-in scatter plot between (micro) loan growth rates and Surplus/Shortfall, which
is defined in Eq. (1). The black line represents a linear fit.
We expect most of the adjustment in credit to occur within a year after the bank was found to
have a shortfall (or a surplus) because they are required to restore their capital adequacy in that
period. Besides, banks might decide to restore it (and thereby adjust credit) even sooner out of
treated as unexpected.
12In the empirical application we exclude all the observations at 1s and 100th percentile of loan growth distribution.
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prudential concerns.
We now show that firm-specific loan growth depends on the origin of the loan. Loans originating
from surplus banks are expected to grow faster or to decrease by less, compared to loans originating
from the shortfall banks. The difference is expressed for firms that hold loans with at least two
banks, and where out of the two (or more banks) at least one had a capital shortfall and at least
one had a surplus.
We report the Welch (1947) test for equality of means in Table 2. The null hypothesis states
that there is no statistically significant difference between average loan growth rates of firms financed
by banks with a shortfall or with a surplus. Because our data is dispersed and winsorized we also
perform Mann and Whitney (1947) test for equality of medians13.
Table 2: Average credit growth across surplus and shortfall banks
1q 2q 3q average
N Mean N Mean N Mean
Total capital requirements
Surplus banks 19703 -0.003 19165 0.004 21941 0.021
Shortfall banks 13568 -0.037 13131 -0.038 15023 -0.024
Welch p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mann-Whitney p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tier 1 capital requirements
Surplus banks 30454 0.005 29682 0.016 33617 0.036
Shortfall banks 20826 -0.012 20157 -0.005 23252 0.004
Welch p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mann-Whitney p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Source: Bank of Slovenia, own calculations.
Notes: In this table we report and test the difference in average loan growth at the
firm level between banks in a capital surplus and shortfall position. The statistics
are calculated for the same firms borrowing from at least two banks, where at least
one had a capital shortfall and at least one had a surplus. Statistics are reported
across three different periods and for total and Tier 1 capital requirements. Sample
is 2009Q3-2015Q3. Capital shortfall is defined in Eq. (2).
The table contains six columns, separated into three double columns. Each double column
contains the number of loan relations with banks in a shortfall or surplus position (N) and average
loan growth by type of a bank (Mean). 1q stands for average loan growth between 1 quarter before
and after the notification (similar for 2q). 3q average stands growth of the average loan amount in
the 3 quarters after the notification compared to the 3 quarters before it.
Note that loan amount enters loan growth and CAR. This could cause reverse causality bias.
Yet, each firm’s specific loan is small compared to the bank’s total stock of loans, and is thus unlikely
13We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting it.
9
to be causal. Besides, loans that enter CAR pre-date the loans included in the loan growth reported
above. It takes time for the supervisor to analyze the data and draft a decision. Finally, we ensure
that there is no overlap in the credit growth between two consecutive SREP processes.
The table also contains two separate blocks of rows. The first block reports loan growth for
the Total capital requirements and the second for the Tier I capital requirements. The mean tests
are performed over both types of capital because it’s possible that one type of capital is better in
explaining loan growth than the other. It would then be important to use the type of capital that
is more likely to be causal for loan growth.
Finally, in the last two rows, we test for differences in mean and median with Welch’s and Mann-
Whitney’s test, respectively. The average growth rate of loans is statistically different in shortfall
banks compared to surplus banks, regardless of the type of capital, horizon and type of test.
Note also that loan demand is implicitly controlled for in Table 2. The table includes only firms
that have loan relations with surplus and shortfall banks. If the firm’s loan demand changes, the
change should affect surplus and shortfall banks simultaneously and with the same magnitude14.
However, the difference in average growth rates could be driven by third factors, which we control
for in a regression model.
3 Model
In this section, we describe the identification strategy employed in the loan-level model. The key
advantage of the loan-level model is that it controls for loan demand and thereby yields unbiased and
consistent estimates of the coefficients. The methodology described in this section was put forward
by Khwaja and Mian (2008) and further adopted by Jiménez et al. (2012) and others.
Khwaja and Mian (2008) use a clever estimation technique that controls for loan demand, which
is unobserved15. This implies that any model explaining credit growth is missing a key control
variable. If omitted control variable is correlated with regressors the coefficients are biased and
inconsistent. The extent of bias depends on the strength of correlation. One can still use the model
by introducing reasonable proxies for loan demand, such as the real GDP or investment, but he will
remain uninformed on the extent of bias left.
14We are making an assumption that loan demand is independent of a bank. This is a common assumption in the
difference-in-difference models. If loan demand is instead bank-specific, it can be controlled for with loan application
data. Loan application data are unfortunately rare. We further discuss this assumption later in the text.
15Data on loan applications, which are a good proxy for loan demand, are rare. See for example Jiménez et al. (2012).
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Khwaja and Mian (2008) bypass this issue by exploiting the data at loan level. Their data consists
of borrowers who have at least two banking relations. The idea is intuitive. If the borrower’s loan
demand is constant between the two banks in a given time period, we can introduce a borrower-
specific dummy that controls for loan demand in that time period. An analogous approach is used
in a fixed effects model by means of transforming the data over the time dimension16. However, the
variable that we need to control for (the loan demand) is not fixed over time. It is instead fixed over
a borrower within each single time period. If we then have more than one observation per borrower,
for each single time period, we can control for loan demand. The next few paragraphs present a
simplified example that explains the idea originally presented in Khwaja and Mian (2008). The
example presented in Khwaja and Mian (2008) is for a cross section (e.g., yijt is not time indexed).
They do mention that the model can be applied to a time series setting.
Suppose we have N borrowers with at least two banking relations17:
yijt = βXijt + ηi + νit + ijt (3)
Where yijt stands for borrower i’s loan (where i = 1...N) borrowed from bank j (where j = 1...M)
in time t (where t = 1...T ). Xijt represents a K × 1 vector of policy and control variables that we
do not specify at this point. ηi represents the conventional fixed effects. They control for borrower
characteristics that do not change over time. Suppose we now add to Eq. (3) a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 for individual i and zero elsewhere18. Because ηi is time invariant it will
be absorbed by the dummy variable:
yijt = βXijt + γDi + νit + ijt (4)
This would be the conventional fixed effects model where Di controls for ηi. However, the
borrower’s loan demand (νit) is time-variant. Because it is time-variant, it cannot be absorbed
by the time-invariant dummy Di. If we then estimate equation 4 as it is, νit will be absorbed
into the error term. If the error term is correlated with the regressors in Xijt, β will be biased and
16Note the subtle difference between the fixed effects estimator and the Khwaja and Mian (2008) difference-in-
difference estimator. The fixed effects estimator exploits the fact that the fixed effects are constant over time. With at
least two time periods they can be controlled for using a dummy for each borrower or by means of data transformation.
But, loan demand changes over time so one cannot control for it using a time constant dummy for each borrower.
17This is a reduced form model. Khwaja and Mian (2008) derive it from a simplified theoretical model.
18The estimator of this kind of model is called the least squares dummy variable estimator. If the number of
borrower’s (N) is large we cancel out the fixed effects by transforming the data. We can, for example, use first
differences: ∆tyijt = β∆tXijt + ∆tνit + ∆tijt, where ∆t represents differencing over time.
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inconsistent. Jiménez et al. (2012) instead control for loan demand by introducing a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 for borrower i, over all banks j (j = 1...M) in time period t19:
yijt = βXijt + γDit + ijt (5)
Borrower-specific time dummy (Dit) will absorb the loan demand (νit), rendering the estimates
of β unbiased and consistent. Note also that the conventional fixed effects (Di) are now excluded
from the model because they are controlled for by Dit (they are perfectly collinear). By the same
argument, the firm-time specific dummy absorbs time fixed effects (should they be included in Xijt).
The model in Eq. (5) is general. In the next section, we specify Xijt and present the results.
4 Results
Results include three tables with multiple regressions and a figure. They highlight different relations
between a capital shortfall or surplus and bank behaviour. The first table shows that banks with a
capital shortfall tend to decrease loan supply. We also show that restructuring of distressed banks
expands bank lending. Next, we show that when surplus/shortfall is controlled for, the CAR (which
is often used in empirical literature to identify the effects of capital requirements on loan supply)
becomes insignificant. Finally, when we control for firm riskiness we find that banks with a shortfall
decrease lending to prime-rated firms by more than banks with a surplus. This shifts their credit
portfolio towards riskier clients. They also decrease provisioning for NPLs. We conclude that an
increase in capital requirements is contractionary and could increase a bank’s credit risk. Policy
implications are discussed in the conclusion.
Main results are in Table 3. It shows that banks with a shortfall decrease loans to the same firm
by more than banks with a surplus. Relative to surplus banks they tend to decrease lending to firms
with highest credit rating.
Loan Growth is bank-firm specific and the sample period is 2009-2015. The model includes
firm-time fixed effects (see Eq. (5) in the Model section) and bank-specific variables20. The choice
of control variables was guided by theory and related research (see for example Khwaja and Mian
19To avoid introducing a large number of dummies we can difference the data for each individual i, in each time
period t, over the two banks: ∆j=1,2∆tyijt = β∆j=1,2∆tXijt + ∆j=1,2∆tijt, where ∆j=1,2 is the difference related to
banks 1 and 2. Note that variables that are fixed across the banks for a given borrower i in a given time period t will
be excluded from the model.
20The reader will note that other variables that do not change for firm i, between banks j in time t, are controlled
for with firm-time fixed effects. Such variables could include real business cycle, borrowers financial soundness, firm
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Table 3: The effect of capital surplus/shortfall on bank lending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms Performing firms
Surplus/Shortfall 0.61 0.91* 0.37 -0.38
Surplus/Shortfall ×Dtrans -3.81*** -4.79*** -6.79*** -6.72***
Capital adequacy 0.01 0.14 0.78** 0.10 0.39
Capital adequacy ×Dtrans 1.11***
Surplus/Shortfall ×Dshortfall 3.17* 3.74**
Rating -0.05***
DRatingA ×DShortfall -0.05**
DRatingBCDE ×DShortfall 0.01
NPL ratio -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
Total assets 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
Constant 0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.07
Firm-time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 36964 31477 31477 31442 31442
Source: Bank of Slovenia, own calculations.
Notes: In the table we report the effect of a capital surplus/shortfall on loan growth
for firms borrowing from at least two banks that differ in the size of surplus/shortfall.
The dependent variable is credit growth between the average loan amount in 3 quar-
ters after the SREP letter was sent relative to 3 quarters average before the letter.
Shortfall and Surplus are defined in equations (1) and (2). Dtrans is a dummy vari-
able that takes value 1 if a bank was subjected to a transfer of NPLs to a Bank Asset
Management Company. All the models include firm-time fixed effects, which control
for firm characteristics. We use robust standard errors. Significance: * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
(2008), Jiménez et al. (2017) and Bonaccorsi di Patti and Sette (2016)). Surplus/Shortfall is de-
scribed in the section on Capital Requirements (see Eq. (1)). Capital adequacy stands for CAR
and controls for capitalization of the bank, NPL ratio for share of NPLs21 (controls for bank’s risk
preferences) and Total assets control for bank size.
Surplus/Shortfall×Dtrans is a control variable that interacts Surplus/Shortfall with a dummy
variable Dtrans. Dtrans takes a value of 1 if bank j was in year t subjected to a transfer of NPLs
to a Bank Asset Management Company (BAMC) and recapitalized by the government. In 2013,
Slovenian authorities collaborated with the ECB and the European Commission in a comprehensive
review. It included asset quality review and stress tests (for details, see Bank of Slovenia (2013)).
Following the review, several banks were found distressed or insolvent. The distressed banks were
capitalized by the government and a portion of their bad assets was transferred to the BAMC. In
exchange they received safe bonds22.
We excluded credit data for firms whose debt was transferred to the BAMC. Even so, it is still
size, etc.
21NPLs are defined as the share of borrowers classified in rating classes C, D or E. Rating scale is from A to E.
22Further information can be found in Bank of Slovenia (2015) and on the BAMC web-page.
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important to control for this effect as distressed banks had a large capital shortfall (see Bank of Slove-
nia (2013)). We would expect them to contract lending extensively to meet capital requirements.
These cases are however different. It was known in advance that the government plans to capitalize
them. Therefore they were not constrained by capital shortfall even though it was high. Also, not
only was the capital shortfall not binding for them, they received an extensive capital injection. We
expect them to lend more, not less. The interaction variable Surplus/Shortfall×Dtrans controls for
these unique events.
Table 3 includes five columns. In the first column, we present results for the full sample. In the
second column, we present them for the sample of firms that are performing23 over the whole sample
period. We focus on this sample because the sample of all firms is prone to bias. Due to accounting
rules, the non-paid interest of defaulted firms is added to the outstanding amount of loan. This
could be falsely interpreted as an increase in loan amount.
In column (3,) we present results for a regression that excludes capital Surplus/Shortfall. In
column (4), we distinguish between responses to capital shortfall and capital surplus. Finally, in
column (5), we present evidence that banks with a capital shortfall shift their credit portfolio towards
riskier clients.
All significant control variables have expected signs. Banks with a higher share of NPLs decrease
their credit supply by more than banks that have a lower share of NPLs. The effect is significant but
rather small. Bank size, measured with total assets, is statistically and economically insignificant.
Regression (2) shows that if the same firm borrows from a bank with a 1 p.p. lower Sur-
plus/Shortfall, it is expected to have a 0.91 p.p. lower loan growth (or 0.61 p.p. when the sample
of all firms is used, see regression (1))24. The result is significant at the 10% level. This is likely
because banks with a shortfall tend to decreases their lending to improve their capital ratios, but
banks with a surplus increase it to improve their profitability per-unit of capital.
The coefficient on Surplus/Shortfall for distressed banks, subject to a transfer of assets to the
BAMC (Surplus/Shortfall×Dtrans), is negative and significant at 1%. We estimate that an additional
1 p.p. increase in the shortfall is expected to increase loan growth to the same firm (at the time
of the transfers) by 3.88 p.p. (= −1 × (−4.79 + 0.91)). The coefficient is capturing the effects of
government-led bank (re)capitalization. We conclude that bank-restructuring process had strong
23Firms with less than 90 days overdue in loan repayment.
24Surplus/Shortfall and loan growth enter the model as a number and not as a percentage. To calculate the effect
of a 1 p.p. increase in Surplus/Shortfall the coefficient is multiplied by 0.01, giving the results 0.91× 0.01 = 0.0091 =
0.91p.p.
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and positive effects on lending.
In regression (3) we omit capital Surplus/Shortfall. Due to its omission, the coefficient on CAR
becomes positive and statistically significant (the exact level of significance is 1.7%). The effect of a 1
p.p. increase in CAR is estimated to be similar (0.78) to a 1 p.p. increase in Surplus/Shortfall (0.91).
We have argued that transfers of distressed assets to the BAMC are important for a response of
bank lending to capital. Thus the regression includes an interaction term that controls for transfers
(Capital adequacy ×Dtrans)25. As in regression (3), we find a positive and significant effect on loan
growth26.
The coefficient on CAR becomes statistically insignificant when we add capital Surplus/Shortfall
(compare regression (3) with regression (2)). The reason is that Surplus/Shortfall, by construction,
conveys more information on future loan growth. Banks will have to adjust their lending (and other
balance sheet items) to restore their capital ratios in a period of one year. It is a forward-looking
measure of bank capitalization.
We assumed that the response to a 1 p.p. decrease in Surplus/Shortfall is the same for all banks
(0.91 p.p. in regression (2)). However, banks with a shortfall are required to restore their CAR,
whereas banks with a surplus are not required to act. Therefore, it could be that the response
is asymmetric across the two types. In regression (4), we test for asymmetric effects. We take
regression (2) and add to it an interaction term between Surplus/Shortfall and a dummy variable
DShortfall. DShortfall takes the value 1 if bank had a shortfall (see Eq. (2)) in section on Capital
Requirements). The coefficient on the interaction term is significant at 10%. It tells us that the
same firm is expected to have a 3.54 p.p. (= 0.37 + 3.17) lower loan growth when borrowing from
a bank with a 1 p.p. higher capital shortfall. The effect is substantial and likely occurs because
shortfall banks decrease loans to improve their CAR.
We next investigate if policy-induced changes in bank capital affect banks risk-taking. Banks can
decrease their risk-weighted assets (and increase the CAR) by reducing lending to riskier borrowers.
This is especially holds for the internal rating based (IRB) regulatory approach27. Under the IRB
approach risk weight is a function of a borrower’s probability of default. All Slovenian banks, except
one, use the standardized approach to calculate capital requirements for their corporate portfolio.
25If the interaction term is omitted from the regression, the coefficient on CAR becomes insignificant with the exact
level of significance at 14.4%. At the suggestion of a referee, we also verified the robustness of regressions (4) and (5)
to the inclusion of the interaction term. The interaction term is insignificant and does not change the conclusions.
26CAR is taken from a period just before the notification letter was sent to the bank. This implies that its value is
lower compared to its value after recapitalization took place.
27The Internal rating based (IRB) regulatory approach is an approach to portfolio and credit risk evaluation under
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Under the standardized approach banks use external credit ratings to determine risk weights28.
However, these are available only for a small fraction of Slovenian firms. As a result, banks must
apply a common risk weight of 100% for all performing firms, except those for which external credit
ratings are available29. Since firms are assigned the same risk weight banks lack incentive to decrease
loans to risky borrowers. Banks with a shortfall have an incentive to lend more to them because
this could increase capital through higher profit and prevent risky borrowers from being classified
as non-performing.
We now investigate how firm risk affects banks (regression (5)). Banks classify firms into risk
brackets that range from A (best) to E (worst). We quantify them by assigning them values from
0 (A) to 4 (E) and label this variable Rating. We find that a downgrade by one risk bracket is
expected to decrease loan growth by 5 p.p..
The regression also includes an interaction between a dummy variable for banks with a capital
shortfall (DShortfall) and two dummy variables for firm risk. The first is for A-rated firms (DRatingA)
and the second for firms with credit ratings B, C, D and E (DRatingBCDE). The distribution of firms
is skewed towards A-rated firms. We also exclude the non-performing firms so the number of firms
with credit rating D and E is small. To ensure a sufficient number of observations per a dummy
variable we join B, C, D and E rated firms in one group.
We find that banks with a capital shortfall decrease lending to best-rated firms by 5 p.p. more
compared to banks with a capital surplus. The result is significant at the conventional level. The
coefficient on DRatingBCDE×DShortfall tells us that banks with a shortfall increase lending to riskier
firms by 1 p.p. more compared to banks with a surplus, however, it is not statistically significant30.
The results imply that regulatory capital requirements can have and adverse effects on bank
risk-taking. After an increase in capital requirements banks with a shortfall increase the share of
risky firms in their portfolio. Thus, the supervisor should limit their options in adjusting assets in
a way that would prohibit them from further risk-taking.
The results presented so far depend on a specific time window that is used for the calculation of
credit growth. We compare the average loan amount in the three quarters after the notification is
which banks estimate credit risk themselves.
28For details see Capital requirements regulation (CRR) or Basel II.
29Note that in line with CRR a risk weight for defaulted firms can also be 150%. In our sample we exclude defaulted
firms and this does not apply.
30As a robustness check we interacted individual rating classes (from A to E) with a dummy variable for shortfall.
The coefficient on the interaction with rating class E is positive and statistically significant. This tells us that banks
with a shortfall tend to increase lending to worst-rated firms. However, the sample of E-rated firms is small, which
makes the result less reliable.
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received by the bank with the average loan amount in the three quarters before. The results could
depend on the chosen time window.
We now present the results with alternative time windows. We estimate regression from column
(2) (Table 3) using two additional windows that were introduced in Section 2. We also present the
estimates that use Tier 1 capital to derive Surplus/Shortfall (see Section 2).
We summarize the results in Figure 2. The two lines show the estimated coefficients on capital
shortfall. The solid line refers to Surplus/Shortfall defined from total and the dashed line from Tier
1 capital requirements. They show that the effect of Surplus/Shortfall on lending is positive for
both definitions of shortfall and across all horizons. Using robust standard errors, all the estimated
effects are significant at the 10% level. The results are robust with respect to the time window used
in the calculation of credit growth as well as to two different measures of shortfall.
Figure 2: Coefficient for Loan growth across three different horizons
Source: Bank of Slovenia, own calculations.
Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
We found that banks that received notification for an increase in capital requirements, decrease
loan growth by more than banks with a capital surplus. This was anticipated by the discussion in
Section 2. They decrease lending, which decreases risk-weighted assets and improves CAR.
We now investigate how capital requirements affect bank loan loss provisioning. The dependent
31It is calculated as ∆CRijt =
Provisionsij,t+1
Loansij,t+1
− Provisionsij,t−1
Loansij,t−1 , where t refers to the date of SREP letter was sent.
Provisions and loans in t− 1 and t+ 1 are calculated as a three-quarter averages before and after the letter.
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variable in Table 4 is the change in the coverage ratio for firm i in bank j in the period when the
SREP letter was sent.31 We present results for four sub-samples. In column (1), we show the results
for the full sample of firms. In columns (2) to (4), we show them for samples of firms with different
loan payment deferments. In Column (2), we use firms that have loans with repayment overdue
by at least one day. In column (3), we firms that have loans overdue 90 days or more. In column
(4), we use firms that have loans overdue 90 days or more and have defaulted after the bank has
received the notification letter on the capital requirement. The last three samples contain borrowers
for which banks should be setting the highest provisioning rates.
Table 4: The effect of increased capital requirements on bank loan loss provisioning
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overduebefore ≤ 90,All firms Overdue > 0 Overdue > 90
Overdueafter > 90
Surplus/Shortfall 0.263** 0.958** 1.117** 3.372**
Surplus/Shortfall ×Dtrans -1.715*** -3.476*** -3.481*** -3.468
Capital adequacy -0.002* -0.010** -0.010* -0.026
NPL ratio 0.001* 0.001 0.002 0.0001
Total assets 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
Overdue 0.0002
Constant 0.066*** 0.200*** 0.240*** 0.469**
Firm-time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 25204 10660 6463 1892
Source: Bank of Slovenia, own calculations.
Notes: In the table we report the effect of a capital surplus/shortfall on the change in the coverage
ratio of the same firms, borrowing from at least two banks, that differ in the size of surplus/shortfall.
The results are reported across 4 sub-samples: (1) all firms, (2) and (3) includes firms that had over-
due higher than 0 and 90 days, respectively, whereas (4) includes firms that become more than 90 days
overdue after the SREP letter was sent. The results are reported using robust standard errors. Signif-
icance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The results are intuitive. They show that banks with a higher Surplus/Shortfall tend to provision
more. Using the full sample of firms, we find that the coverage ratio of the same firm increases by
0.263 p.p. more in banks with a 1 p.p. higher Surplus/Shortfall. This is also confirmed by the other
three samples where the effect is even stronger.
We now focus on the sample of firms that are more than 90 days overdue in loan repayment
(see column (3)). This criterion is used to classify loans as non-performing. We find that the
coverage ratio of the same firm increases on average by 1.12 p.p. more in banks with a 1 p.p. higher
Surplus/Shortfall. Thus, the higher the capital shortfall the less banks provision for bad loans.
Furthermore, in column (4) we focus on firms that defaulted after a SREP letter was received by
a bank. For these firms, banks are required to create new provisions at the exact moment when
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they are pressed by new capital requirements. The interaction between capital requirements and
provisions is the strongest in this sample of firms, setting an upper bound to our estimates. We
conclude that capital requirements decrease provisioning rates for defaulted borrowers (or increase
them by less), which is not an outcome that policymaker desires.
Again we find the opposite effect for banks that are subject to the transfer of bad assets to the
BAMC. Across all sub-samples, these banks provisioned more despite having a high capital shortfall.
Large state-led recapitalization enabled them to act so.
The results presented in the previous paragraphs could be sensitive to the lack of two control
variables, the time period a firm is in default and the collateral.
The first omitted control variable, the time period in default, is not the same across all banks.
So, we control it by using the exact number of days overdue in each bank. We use the number of
days overdue only for the sample of firms presented in column (4). In that sample, the difference in
the number of days overdue could be important because it includes new defaulters. However, it is
statistically insignificant.
The second omitted control variable, the collateral, is to some degree controlled for with fixed
effects. They capture the total available collateral of a firm. Banks, however, differ in their strategy
and ability to engage firm collateral. Unfortunately, we cannot control for the exact amount of
the collateral pledged by firm i in bank j because these data are not available. However, we can
assess the direction of bias, under the assumption that the collateral affects loan loss provisioning.
Our estimates are expected to be downward biased. Had we been able to control for the effect of
the collateral the surplus/shortfall coefficient would have been more positive. Why? The direction
of bias is determined by the correlation between provisioning, collateral and shortfall. First, we
expect that the surplus/shortfall and collateral are positively correlated. The reason is that one
of the inputs in the determination of a bank’s capital requirements is the size and quality of the
bank’s collateral. The smaller the size and the lower the quality of the bank’s collateral, the higher
the capital requirement and its shortfall will be. Next, we know that the collateral and loan loss
provisions are negatively correlated. This follows the regulatory accounting rules. There would be
no provisioning for loan losses had the loans been fully collateralized. We conclude that our omitted
variable (collateral) is positively correlated with our target variable (surplus/shortfall) and negatively
with our dependent variable (loan loss provisions). Therefore, if a surplus/shortfall really acts as a
proxy for collateral, it will be downward biased. Because the coefficient on the surplus/shortfall is
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positive but downward biased the estimate represents its lower boundary.
We conclude that banks with a shortfall tend to provision less than banks with a surplus. Banks
adapt to increased regulatory capital requirements by engaging in risky behavior. Supervisors should
devise mechanisms that would prevent or prohibit them from further increasing risk in the banking
sector.
4.1 Can firms substitute for a capital shortfall shock?
So far we have shown that banks with a capital shortfall reduce lending (to the same firm) by more
than banks with a surplus. But, the aggregate effect remains unclear. Firms could compensate for a
decrease in lending from a shortfall bank by borrowing more from a surplus bank. In this section, we
show that firms cannot fully compensate for a decrease in lending from a shortfall bank. Therefore,
the total effect should be negative. However, these results should be interpreted with caution. To
estimate the aggregate effect, we need to use a model that does not fully control for loan demand.
We now explain how we construct the dependent and the policy variable. The dependent variable
is a sum over firm i’s loans across all banks. We then calculate credit growth by using our benchmark
time window: 3 quarters before and after the letter was received by the bank. Our policy variable
is the share of firm i’s loans borrowed from banks with a capital shortfall. It is calculated for the
time period when the banks received the notification letter.
If firms can compensate for the decrease in lending from shortfall banks, by borrowing from
surplus banks, the coefficient on the share of loans borrowed from shortfall banks will be insignificant.
On the other hand, if the coefficient is significant and negative, capital shortfall decreases aggregate
firm borrowing.
We include several firm-specific financial ratios to control for loan demand. We use credit rating
and fixed effects at firm and time level. This identification strategy is weaker compared to the
difference-in-difference estimates. Results presented in this section should thus be interpreted with
caution.
Table 5 shows three sets of results that differ in control variables. We use the full sample of
firms since we are no longer constrained with including only firms indebted to at least two banks.
The coefficient on the share of shortfall is negative and statistically significant in all regressions.
We judge that the most realistic estimate is in column (3). That regression includes the full set of
controls: firm financial ratios, average credit rating (for firm riskiness), firm fixed effects and time
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fixed effects. A firm that borrows from banks with a shortfall is expected to have (on average) a
3 p.p. lower credit growth compared to a firm that borrows from surplus banks. This implies that
firms cannot compensate for a decrease in lending from shortfall banks by borrowing more from
surplus banks. This result was expected. Changing banks in a crisis period is extremely difficult
since sources are limited and banks are cautious.
Table 5: The effect of capital shortfall on aggregate firm borrowing
(1) (2) (3)
Shortfall share -0.158*** -0.029** -0.030**
Quick ratio -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
Debt-to-asset ratio -0.006** -0.006** -0.004**
Asset turnover ratio 0.062*** 0.047*** 0.045***
Return on assets -0.043 -0.067** -0.062**
Rating -0.097***
Constant 0.001 0.168*** 0.210***
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes
No. of observations 83245 83245 83135
Source: Bank of Slovenia, own calculations.
Notes: The table reports the effect of capital shortfall on aggre-
gate firm borrowing. Shortfall share is the share of total loans
borrowed from banks with a capital shortfall. We also control
for firm liquidity (Quick ratio), indebtedness (Debt-to-asset ra-
tio), efficiency (Asset turnover ratio), profitability (Return on
assets) and riskiness (average credit rating assigned by banks).
The results are reported using robust standard errors. Signifi-
cance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
5 Conclusions
We estimate how banks respond to policy-induced changes in capital. We provide two contributions
to the literature.
First, we show that conventional variables, that are used to estimate the effect of policy-related
changes in capital on the supply of credit, are flawed. Capital ratios contain non-policy-induced
changes in capital and reflect past policy requirements. Banks must respond to capital requirements
before they become binding. We instead collect notification letters sent to Slovenian banks over the
period 2009-2015. They inform them of their future required CAR that is to be fulfilled in a year.
We use them to construct a forward-looking measure of bank capital surplus/shortfall. When we
include it in regression the coefficient on the CAR becomes insignificant. Also, the magnitudes of
the two coefficients are very different.
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A forward-looking measure of capital requirements crucial to asses the effects of capital policy
on banks.
Second, banks with a capital shortfall engage in a risky behaviour in response to increased capital
requirements. Compared to banks with a surplus they lend less to firms with the highest credit rating
and provision less for NPLs.
This result carries implications. After a CAR announcement, policymakers should not only be
concerned with a capital shortfall. They should closely supervise the risk-taking by banks and devise
mechanism that prohibit it.
References
Shekhar S Aiyar, Charles W Calomiris, and Tomasz Wieladek. How does credit supply respond
to monetary policy and bank minimum capital requirements? European Economic Review, 82:
142–165, 2016.
Elena Beccalli, Pascal Frantz, and Francesca Lenoci. Hidden effects of bank recapitalizations. Journal
of Banking & Finance, 94:297–314, 2018.
Marcus Behn, Rainer Haselmann, and Paul Wachtel. Procyclical capital regulation and ledning.
Journal of Finance, 71:919–956, 2016.
Ben S Bernanke, Cara S Lown, and Benjamin M Friedman. The credit crunch. Brookings papers on
economic activity, 1991(2):205–247, 1991.
Jose M Berrospide and Rochelle M Edge. The effects of bank capital on lending: What do we know,
and what does it mean? International Journal of Central Banking, 6(4):5–54, 2010.
Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti and Enrico Sette. Did the securitization makret freeze affect bank lending
during the financial crisis? evidence from a credit register. Journal of Financial Intermediation,
25:54–76, 2016.
Arjana Brezigar-Masten, Igor Masten, and Matjaž Volk. Discretionary credit rating and bank sta-
bility in a financial crisis. Eastern European Economics, 53:377–402, 2015.
Matteo Ciccarelli, Angela Maddaloni, and José-Luis Peydró. Trusting the bankers: A new look at
the credit channel of monetary policy. Review of Economic Dynamics, 18:979–1002, 2015.
22
Stijn Claessens. An overview of macroprudential policy tools. Annual Review of Financial Eco-
nomics, 7:397–422, 2015.
Olivier De Jonghe, Hans Dewachter, and Steven Ongena. Bank capital (requirements) and credit
supply: Evidence from pillar 2 decisions. 2016.
Leonardo Gambacorta and Paolo Emilio Mistrulli. Does bank capital affect lending behavior? Jour-
nal of Financial intermediation, 13(4):436–457, 2004.
Reint Gropp, Thomas Mosk, Steven Ongena, and Carlo Wix. Bank response to higher capital
requirements: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment. Review of Financil Studies, 32:266–299,
2019.
Diana Hancock and James A Wilcox. Bank capital and the credit crunch: The roles of risk-weighted
and unweighted capital regulations. Real Estate Economics, 22(1):59–94, 1994.
Diana Hancock, Andrew J Laing, and James A Wilcox. Bank capital shocks: dynamic effects on
securities, loans, and capital. Journal of Banking & Finance, 19(3):661–677, 1995.
Philipp Hartmann, Haizhou Huang, and Dirk Schoenmaker. The Changing Fortunes of Central
Banking. Cambridge University Press, 2018.
Gabriel Jiménez, Steven Ongena, José-Luis Peydró, and Jesús Saurina. Credit supply and mone-
tary policy: Identifying the bank balance-sheet channel with loan applications. The American
Economic Review, 102(5):2301–2326, 2012.
Gabriel Jiménez, Steven Ongena, José-Luis Peydró, and Jesus Saurina Salas. Macroprudential
policy, countercyclical bank capital buffers and credit supply: Evidence from the spanish dynamic
provisioning experiments. Journal of Political Economy, 125(6):2126–2177, 2017.
Asim Ijaz Khwaja and Atif Mian. Tracing the impact of bank liquidity shocks: Evidence from an
emerging market. The American Economic Review, 98(4):1413–1442, 2008.
Ruby P Kishan and Timothy P Opiela. Bank size, bank capital, and the bank lending channel.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, pages 121–141, 2000.
Henry B. Mann and Donald R. Whitney. On a test of whether one of two random variables is
stochastically larger than the other. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 18:50–60, 1947.
23
Jean-Stephane Mesonnier and Allen Monks. Did the eba capital exercise cause a credit crunch in
the euro area? International Journal of Central Banking, 11(3):75–117, 2015.
Bank of Slovenia. Full report on the comprehensive review of the banking system. 2013. URL
http://www.bsi.si/library/includes/datoteka.asp?DatotekaId=5457.
Bank of Slovenia. Report of the bank of slovenia on the causes of the capital shortfalls of banks.
2015. URL www.bsi.si/library/includes/datoteka.asp?DatotekaId=6209.
Jose-Luis Peydro. Discussion of “the effects of bank capital on lending: What do we know, and what
does it mean. International Journal of Central Banking, 6(4):55–68, 2010.
Anjan V Thakor. Capital requirements, monetary policy, and aggregate bank lending: theory and
empirical evidence. The Journal of Finance, 51(1):279–324, 1996.
Bernard L Welch. The generalization ofstudent’s’ problem when several different population vari-
ances are involved. Biometrika, 34(1/2):28–35, 1947.
24
